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Abstract
We study a labour market in which ﬁrms can observe workers’
output but not their eﬀort, and in which a worker’s productivity in a
given ﬁrm depends on a worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc component, unobservable
for the ﬁrm. Firms oﬀer wage contracts that optimally trade oﬀ eﬀort
and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in
turn create unemployment. We show that the incentive power of the
equilibrium wage contract is constrained socially eﬃcient in the ab-
sence of unemployment beneﬁts. We then apply the model to explain
the recent increase in performance-pay contracts. Within our model,
this can be explained by three diﬀerent factors: (i) increased impor-
tance of non-observable eﬀort, (ii) a fall in the marginal tax rate, (iii)
a reduction in the heterogeneity of workers performing the same task.
The likely eﬀect of all three factors is an increase in the equilibrium
unemployment rate.
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1 Introduction
Within the economics profession, a large body of knowledge has been
produced on how to design optimal contracts. Furthermore, a new subﬁeld
within economics, personnel economics, is primarily concerned with how this
body of knowledge can be applied to construct optimal wage contracts within
ﬁrms. It is puzzling therefore, that so little research eﬀort in the last decade
has been directed towards the question of how diﬀerent kinds of wage con-
tracts within ﬁrms may inﬂuence the overall performance of the economy.
1Particularly because there is evidence that the use of wage contracts is chang-
ing in the direction of more performance-related pay.
It has not always been like this. In the eighties, the eﬀects of diﬀerent
kinds of wage contracts on the macroeconomic behaviour of the economy was
much in focus. Weitzman’s (1985) idea that proﬁt sharing between workers
and ﬁrms may increase ﬁrms’ incentives to hire new employees and vacuum
clean the market for unemployed workers was intensely debated before it
was rejected by most of the profession. The shirking model by Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), where wages are increased as a response to costly monitoring
of worker eﬀort, is still on most Ph.D. students’ reading list. In addition we
have the literature on implicit contracts (Hart and Holmstrøm 1987) and on
wage bargaining (see Farber 1986 for an overview). However, the modelling
of wage contracts in many of these papers is, to some extent, premature.
Our starting point is a standard contracting problem as described in
Laﬀont and Tirole (1993). When deciding on a contract, the principal trades
oﬀ incentives and rent extraction. As a result, workers obtain (in expected
terms) some rents, in the sense that it is better to be employed than to be
unemployed. Consequently, there is unemployment in equilibrium.
Within our model, workers’ productivity depends on their general produc-
tivity, the match speciﬁc productivity, and their eﬀort. We show that with
ex ante identical workers and no unemployment beneﬁts, the unemployment
rate is constraint eﬃcient in the sense that a planner would not like to alter
the incentive contracts provided by the ﬁrms.
A recent study (Towers and Perrin 1998) indicates that performance-
pay contracts have recently become more widely used. We interpret this
as an increased incentive power of the contracts provided to these workers.
Within our model framework we identify three possible sources for why the
incentive power of labour contracts may increase: First, increased importance
of unmonitored eﬀort provided by the workers. Second, lower labour taxes.
Third, less heterogeneity among workers within a given job category (given
observable characteristics), due to a more segregated labour market and due
to improved selection methods. We ﬁnd that the likely eﬀect of all these
changes is an increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate.
As mentioned above surprisingly little work has been done on the rela-
tionship between optimal output based contracts and the performance of the
labour market. An exception is Foster and Wang (1984) who show that rents
associated with optimal contracts may lead to unemployment. Their paper
diﬀers in several respects from the present paper. First, Foster and Wang
2assume a given number of ﬁrms. With free entry of ﬁrms, as we assume,
unemployment is not an equilibrium outcome in their model. Second, Foster
and Wang do not examine whether the incentives provided by the market are
socially optimal. Finally their paper does not explicitly derive the determi-
nants of the unemployment rate, thereby making it unsuitable for analysing
the eﬀects of changes in the incentive structures on unemployment.
Our paper is also related to the large literature on rents associated with
employment, including the seminal contribution by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
mentioned above. In their model, individual output is unobservable, thereby
ruling out incentive schemes of the type considered here.
The paper is organised as follows: In the next section, we ﬁrst discuss
on a broad level diﬀerent trade-oﬀs that an optimal contract may balance,
and argue that the relationship between worker rents and incentives may
be important. We characterise the optimal contract in this case, and derive
the resulting labour market equilibrium. Section 3 concerns eﬃciency of
this equilibrium. We show that the unemployment rate in this economy is
constrained eﬃcient, in the sense that a planner would not like to alter the
incentive contracts provided by the ﬁrms. In section 4 we derive comparative
statics result, while the last section concludes.
2 Modelling performance pay
As mentioned in the introduction, there exist several diﬀerent models of
optimal contracts in which the costs and beneﬁts of stronger incentives are
balanced at the margin. In most of these models, the gain from providing
stronger incentives to the agent is that this gives rise to higher eﬀort. The
costs (or agency costs) associated with stronger incentives may vary: Firstly,
stronger incentives may give rise to a misallocation of risk, as the agent will
carry a larger share of the risks than an optimal risk-sharing agreement would
imply. Secondly, in a multi-tasking framework, stronger incentives may imply
that the agent will allocate his eﬀort on the diﬀerent tasks ineﬃciently if the
output from some of the tasks cannot be measured adequately. Thirdly, if
the agent has private information about his ability, then providing him with
stronger incentives implies that he captures more economic rents, implying
t h a tt h ep r i n c i p a lf a c e sat r a d e - o ﬀ between incentives and rent extraction.
I nt h i sp a p e rw ef o c u so nt h el a s tt y p eo fm o d e l s ,o f t e nr e f e r r e dt oa s
adverse selection models. A seminal paper on adverse selection models is
3Mirlees (1971), which characterises an optimal tax regime under asymmetric
information. Maskin and Riley (1984) analyse the optimal price discrimina-
tion strategy of a monopolist, and Baron and Myerson (1982) the optimal
regulation of a monopolist. The trade-oﬀ between incentives and rent ex-
traction caused by asymmetric information is studied in detail in Laﬀont
and Tirole (1993), and our model of optimal labour contracts will be closely
related to the standard model in their book.
Two driving assumptions in our model of optimal contracts (as in models
with asymmetric information more generally) are as follows:
1 .T h e r ee x i s t ss o m eex post heterogeneities between the agents. This
means that the productivity of an employee is unknown to the employer
at the point when the wage contract is signed.
2. It is costly for a ﬁrm to replace an employee. These costs may be
search and hiring costs or training costs and are sunk when the ﬁrm
(eventually) learns the productivity of the employee in question.
We will argue that these assumptions have empirical support. The strongest
empirical evidence is found in a unique study by Lazear (2000). Lazear anal-
ysed the eﬀects of a shift from a ﬂat wage rate to performance pay in a
large corporation (Safelite). Lazear had access to data concerning individual
worker productivity before and after the shift in pay structure. Many of his
observations are striking:
1. Productivity diﬀers between workers. The variance in monthly pro-
ductivity as a percentage of the mean was 53 percent before and 49
percent after the switch to piece rate payments. However, this number
includes both within-worker and between-worker components. When
estimating the between-worker components (ability diﬀerences, or what
Lazear refers to as ﬁxed eﬀects), controlling for time and tenure eﬀects,
the variance in percentage of the means are still 24 percent before and
20 percent after the switch to piece rate payments. The diﬀerence in
productivity between the 90th and the 10th percentile of the workers
in percent of the means are 47 percent before and 35 percent after the
s w i t c ht op i e c er a t ep a y m e n t s
2. When introducing piece rate payments, the company included a wage
ﬂoor approximately equal to the ﬁx e dw a g ei n t r o d u c e de a r l i e r .A c c o r d -
ing to Lazear, the ﬁrm did this ”in order to avoid massive turnover”.
4Thus, the ﬁrm regarded it as being in its interest to keep the workers
at the lower end of the productivity scale. Furthermore, many workers
ended up in the guarantee range.
3. Still, 92 percent of the workers experienced a wage increase, and a
quarter of the workers received a wage increase exceeding 28 percent
o ft h ep r e v i o u sw a g e .S i n c ew o r k e r swithin the guarantee wage range
were no worse oﬀ than before the shift, all workers experiencing a wage
increase must be better oﬀ after the shift. Furthermore, the numbers
indicate that many workers were substantially better oﬀ after the shift
to piece rate payment.
Lazear’s ﬁndings thus clearly indicate that the assumptions listed above
(that workers are ex post heterogenous and that it is in the ﬁrms’ interest to
retain not only the very best workers) are valid. It follows that an asymmetric
information model, where ﬁrms trade oﬀ incentives and rent extraction, seems
appropriate when modeling a ﬁrm’s choice of wage contract.
2.1 The model
There are two types of agents in the economy, workers and ﬁrms. The mea-
sure of workers in the economy is constant and normalised to one. Workers
leave the market for exogenous reasons at a rate s, and are replaced by new
w o r k e r st h a te n t e rt h em a r k e ta su n e m p l o y e d .W o r k e r sa n dﬁrms have sym-
metric information about the worker’s productivity at the hiring stage, and
we capture this by assuming that workers are identical ex ante, i.e., before
they are hired by a ﬁrm. We are thus studying a segment of the market
in which workers have the same observable characteristics.1 However, once
employed, the productivity of a given worker also depends on a worker-ﬁrm
1Observable diﬀerences in productivity will not change our results, as the optimal
wage contract will be contingent on all observable characteristics. The important aspect
of the assumption is that workers and ﬁrms are symmetrically informed about the worker’s
producitivity. This is admittedly a strong assumption, as self-selection mechanisms may be
empirically important (see for instance Lazear 2000). On the other hand, the mechanisms
created by self-selection on contracts are very diﬀerent from the mechanisms studied in
this paper. We therefore ﬁnd it rational to separate the eﬀects of self-selection and of
worker rents into two diﬀerent studies, and refer the interested reader to Moen and Rosen
(2001) for the eﬀects of self-selection on contracts.
5speciﬁc productivity term ²,r e ﬂecting that a worker may ﬁtb e t t e ri n t os o m e
jobs than others.
The timing of the hiring process goes as follows:
1. The ﬁrm incurs a search cost K
2. The ﬁrm advertises a wage contract
3. The ﬁrm receives job applications from unemployed workers
4. One of the applicants is hired
5. Production starts.
The time delay associated with the hiring process is assumed to be small
relative to the duration of the employment relationship, and is therefore
ignored.2 As shown below, the ﬁrm will always attract applicants as long as
the expected value of the contract to the worker exceeds his outside option
U0. As we will see, this constraint will not be binding, as ﬁrms will oﬀer
contracts that leave rents to the workers in expected terms.
The worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc term is revealed to the worker after he his hired.
We assume that the time it takes before the worker learns his worker-ﬁrm
speciﬁc productivity term is suﬃciently long so that other applicants for the
job are not available at that point in time. Thus, if the worker leaves at
this point, the ﬁrm has to incur the search cost K over again to hire a new
worker. Still, we assume that this time lag is relatively short compared to
the expected duration of the employment relationship. As the focus of this
paper is not on the behaviour of the worker during the learning process, we
assume that ² is revealed to the worker immediately after he is hired. We
assume that ² is unobservable for the ﬁrm.
The search cost K may be given various interpretations. The most direct
interpretation is that K denotes the cost of advertising a vacancy, for instance
in a newspaper. K may also include costs associated with evaluating and
testing workers. More generally, K may consist of any costs incurred by the
ﬁrm (not the worker) before the worker’s productivity is revealed, which is
wasted if the worker quits. Thus, if the ﬁrm pays for ﬁrm-speciﬁc training
2Note, though, that K m a yp a r t l yr e ﬂect costs associated with time delays caused by
a time-consuming hiring process.
6costs in the initial phase of the employment relationship, this may also be
included in K.
We assume that the value of ² for any worker-ﬁrm pair is continuously dis-
tributed on an interval [²min,² max], and we denote the cumulative distribution
function F. Furthermore, we assume that for a given worker, the worker-ﬁrm
speciﬁc productivity terms in any two ﬁrms are independent. Thus, the real-
isation of ² does not convey any information regarding the ﬁrm-speciﬁct e r m
in another ﬁrm. It follows that a worker’s outside option U0 when employed
is independent of his worker-ﬁrm speciﬁct e r mi nt h a tﬁrm. This is a sim-
plifying assumption. Our main results will hold if a worker’s productivity
term ² in one ﬁrm is correlated with the value in other ﬁr m sa sl o n ga st h e
correlation is less than perfect.
We do not allow for up-front payments (bonding). Thus, the ﬁrm can
not charge an applicant with an entrance fee at the moment he is hired.
Entrance fees will eliminate unemployment in our model. We think the
absence of entrance fees is the strongest assumption we make in the paper.
There has been a debate within the profession regarding the pluasibility of
entrance fees and bonding, see for instance Carmichael and Lorne (1985) and
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). In our setting, the absence of bonding may
be rationalised in several ways.3
First, an entrance fee must be paid before the worker learns his worker-
ﬁrm productivity term. After this term is observed by the worker, it is
optimal to leave rents to ”high-type” workers. The contract we apply below
optimally trades oﬀ worker incentives and worker rents, and at this stage
bonds are superﬂuous as they will not increase ﬁrm proﬁt. Thus, as long
as the worker learns ² relatively quickly, implicit bonding like deferred wage
compensation or seniority wages as in Lazear (1981) does not work. A bond
must be interpreted literally as an up-front payment from the worker to the
ﬁrm (or at least as a payment that proceeds the revelation of ²).
There may be several reasons as to why a worker may be reluctant to pay
its employer an up-front fee suﬃciently high to eliminate all his expected
rents. Ritter and Taylor (1994) shows that if ﬁrms have private informa-
tion regarding its probability of bankruptcy, then requiring a bond can be
interpreted as a sign that its probability of bankruptcy is high. As a result,
3At least the Norwegian legislation does not allow for entrance fees paid to ﬁrms.
The contracts act of 31th of May 1918 no 4, §36, in eﬀe c td e e m su p - f r o n tp a y m e n t sa s
illegal. We believe similar legal restrictions on up-front payments exist in many European
countries,
7ﬁrms with a low probability of bankruptcy leaves rents to the employees.
More generally, with up-front fees the ﬁrm may have an incentive to foul
the workers in various ways, by hiring and collecting bonds from too many
employees, by prematurely replacing the worker (to collect a new bond) etc.
By requiring a low bond or no bond at all, a ﬁrm may signal that it has no
such intensions.4
2.1.1 Optimal contracts
Following a standard approach to contract theory, as laid out in Laﬀont and
Tirole (1993), we assume that the productivity of a worker i in a ﬁrm j can
be written as yij =¯ y + α²ij + γej where ej is worker eﬀort (unobservable
to the ﬁrm) and ¯ y is a constant. The parameter α reﬂects the importance
of the worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc term, and γ the importance of worker eﬀort, for
the output level. Output is observable, and wage contracts may therefore
be made contingent on y. A worker’s utility ﬂow is given by u = w − c(e),
where w denotes the wage and c(e) the eﬀort costs.5 We assume that c(e) is
increasing and that c0(e) is convex, with c0(0) = 0.
The ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ between providing incentives to and extracting
rents from the worker, and the optimal contract reﬂects this trade-oﬀ.I n
order to derive the optimal contract, we employ the revelation principle.6
An optimal wage contract w(²),e(²) maximises ﬁrm proﬁts π given 1) the
worker’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and 2) his individual ratio-
nality (IR) constraint.7
4Suppose for instance that ﬁrms may choose to open a ”fake” vacancy at cost e K<K .A
ﬁrm with a fake vacancy collects an entrance fee, and then ﬁres the worker. If the workers
cannot distinguish between a ﬁrm with a fake vacancy and a ﬁrm with an ordinary vacancy,
the equilibrium entrance fee cannot exeed e K, as the market then would be overﬂooded
with fake vacancies. If e K is not too high, there would still be (an endogeneous amount
of) rents in the economy.
5Strictly speaking, the relevant pay-oﬀs are the expected discounted values of the in-
come ﬂows, or the asset values, not the ﬂows themselves. Note also that the asset values
can be obtained simply by dividing the associated ﬂows with the discount rate r + s.
6We have assumed that the contract is advertised, and thus is constructed before the
worker is hired. The revelation principle can therefore not be interpreted literally.
7When the ﬁrm learns the worker type, it has an incentive to renegotiate the contract.
However, from an ex ante perspective it is optimal for the ﬁrm to commit to the contract.
8Aw o r k e ro f” t y p e ”² can pretend that he is of type e ².I fh ed o e ss o ,h e
obtains a utility
e u(²,e ²)=w(e ²) − c(e(e ²)+
α
γ
(e ² − ²))
The indirect utility ﬂow can be written u(²)=m a x e ² u(²,e ²). The incentive
compatibility constraint (truth-telling constraint) requires that ² =a r gm a x e ² u(²,e ²),





i.e., that u0(²)=c0(e(²))α/γ. Individual rationality requires that for any
worker that stays with the ﬁrm, u(²) ≥ u0 =( r+s)U0, otherwise the worker
will do better by leaving the ﬁrm.
If a worker’s worker-ﬁrm speciﬁct e r mi ss u ﬃciently low, it may not be
in the ﬁrm’s interest to keep him. Let ²c denote the associated cut-oﬀ level
of ². Workers with worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity term below ²c are not
retained.
The proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm with a worker of type ² is given by π(²)=
y+α²+γe(²)−w(²). Inserting u(²)=w−c(e) gives π(²)=y+α²+γe(²)−











This is an optimal control problem, with u as the state variable and e as
control variable. The associated Hamiltonian is given by
H =[ y + α² + γe − c(e) − u]f(²)+λ(c
0(e)α/γ)
where λ is the adjungated function. First order conditions for maximum are





Since there are no terminal conditions at ²max it follows that λ(²max)=0 ,










f(²) is decreasing in ², i.e. f has an increasing hazard rate.
If we assume that c000(e) ≥ 0, it follows that e(²) is increasing in ².N o t et h a t
there are no distortions at the top. That is, c0(e(²max)) = γ,w h i c hi st h ef u l l
information eﬀort.
The optimal cut-oﬀ v a l u es o l v e st h ee q u a t i o nH(²c)=0 ,o r






This equation uniquely determines ec (see Appendix 1). Note that the op-
timal contract for workers that are hired is independent of the cut-oﬀ level.
Note also that the expected proﬁto ft h eﬁrm can be written as a function
of u0,w ew r i t eπ = π(u0),o re q u i v a l e n t l yΠ = Π(U0) (where capital values
indicate asset values rather than ﬂow values), where Π is strictly decreasing
in U0.
Let (a,b) denote a linear contract of the form w = a + by.I t i s w e l l
known that the optimal non-linear contract can be represented by a menu
(a(²),b(²)) of linear contracts. For any b,t h ee ﬀort level chosen by a worker
is such that c0(e)=bγ. We will refer to b as the incentive power of the







Thus, b(²max)=1reﬂe c t i n gt h a tt h e r ea r en od i s t o r t i o n sa tt h et o p . A s -
suming that c000(e) ≥ 0 it follows from (11) that b is strictly increasing in
². Hence, for the lower types, the incentive power of the contract is strictly
10less than one. The intuition is as follows: For any given worker type ²,t h e
ﬁrm faces a trade-oﬀ between giving this worker type stronger incentives and
rent extraction from workers of higher types. The likelihood of obtaining a
worker of type ² is reﬂected in f(²), while the measure of workers with a
higher type is 1 − F(²). The extra rents obtained by higher worker types
by increasing e with one unit is c00(e)/γ. The optimal contract thus scales
down b with an amount equal to
1−F(²)
f(²) c00(e)α/γ2 (the denominator includes
γ squared because b = c0(e)/γ).8
In what follows, we are interested in comparing diﬀe r e n tw a g ec o n t r a c t s .
W es a yt h a tw a g ec o n t r a c tA is more incentive powered than wage contract
B if, bA(²) ≥ bB(²) for all ², with strict inequality for some ² (with strictly
positive measure).











Let e F = F/(1−F(²c)) denote the distribution of ² conditional on being above
²c. The expected rent to a worker with a worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity

















b(²)(1 − F(²c) − F(²))d² (5)
The expected income ﬂo wf o rah i r e dw o r k e rc a nt h u sb ew r i t t e na sE [u(²)] =
u0 + E [ρ]. The expected discounted income for an employed worker is thus
W = U0 + R, where R = E [ρ/(r + s)]. The next lemma shows that E [ρ] is
always strictly positive
8We have not imposed any restrictions on b. A natural restriction would be that b (or
e) are nonegative. This will always be the case if c0(0) = c00(0) = 0.
11Lemma 1 Suppose ²c <² max. Then the expected rent ρ to the worker is
strictly positive.
Proof: No worker type can obtain negative rent, as in this case they would
quit. From (5) it thus follows that ρ is zero if and only if b is zero almost
everywhere. However, from (4) it follows that b(²) is strictly positive for all
² suﬃciently close to ²max.Q E D
2.1.2 Matching
A natural starting point when modelling matching in the labour market is
the urn-ball process (Hall 1979, Montgommery 1991). However, in order to
simplify the analysis, we let the search frictions (but not the search costs)
converge to zero. In order to do this, we ﬁrst divide time into periods, and
then let the time periods converge to zero. In each period, the matching
process goes as follows:
1. Firms advertise vacancies and wage contracts attached to them
2. Unemployed workers observe the advertisements and send an applica-
tion to one of the ﬁrms
3. All ﬁrms that obtain vacancies choose one applicant at random and
start production. The rest of the workers remain unemployed
Let ∆ denote the time length of each period. We study the frictionless
limit in which ∆ → 0. We can then show the following result:
Lemma 2 Consider the limit equilibrium when ∆ → 0.S u p p o s e t h e r e i s
unemployment in this limit equilibrium. Consider a ﬁrm that advertises a
wage contract that gives its employees an expected income that exceeds an
unemployed worker’s expected discounted income U0.T h e n t h i s ﬁrm will
receive an application with probability 1.
Proof : First note that as ∆ → 0, the probability that a worker obtains
aj o bo ﬀer in any given period converges to zero. If not, there would be no
unemployment in the limit equilibrium. Consider a ﬁrm that advertises a
wage contract that gives the employee an expected income E>U 0.T h e
probability of obtaining a job in this ﬁrm must converge to zero when ∆ → 0
12as well. If not, unemployed workers would be strictly better oﬀ applying for
t h i sj o bt h a nf o ra n yo t h e rj o bw i t haﬁnite wage. This again implies that
the probability that the ﬁrm ﬁlls its vacancy converges to one as ∆ → 0.
QED
Thus, if there is unemployment in the limit equilibrium (hereafter just
equilibrium), all vacancies that are advertised are ﬁlled. There is a continuum
of unemployed workers on one side of the market and a ﬂow of new vacancies
that are ﬁlled immediately (so that the stock of vacancies has measure zero)
on the other.
2.2 Equilibrium
It is now time to derive the equilibrium of the labour market. The ﬁrst thing
to note is that free entry of ﬁrms ensures that the expected income Π of a




Since Π is strictly decreasing in U0 this equation determines the equilibrium
value of U0 uniquely. We denote this equilibrium value by U0∗.
The labour market is supposed to be in steady state. Let p denote the
transition rate from unemployment to employment and z the utility ﬂow of
unemployed workers. The relationship between U0 and p is then given by
(r + s)U
0 = z + p(W − U
0) (7)
where W is the expected discounted income when employed. By deﬁnition,
the expected rent R is equal to W −U, hence we can rewrite the equation as
(r + s)U
0 = z + pR (8)
T h ee q u i l i b r i u mi nt h el a b o u rm a r k e tc a nb ed e ﬁned as a pair (p,U0) satis-
fying equation (6) and (8).
With no unemployment, unemployed workers by deﬁnition ﬁnd a job
immediately, which implies that p is inﬁnite. However, this leads to a con-
tradiction, as U0 deﬁned by (8) then goes to inﬁnity and thus exceeds U0∗
as deﬁned by (6). This motivates our ﬁrst proposition.
13Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the unemployment rate is strictly positive
Proof: Given U0∗, equation (3) determines ²∗
c.F u r t h e r m o r e , ²∗
c <² max,
otherwise the ﬁrm would not capitalise K. It then follows from lemma 1 that
the rent ρ is strictly positive. But then it follows from equation (8) that U0
goes to inﬁnity if p does. Thus, p is ﬁnite. QED
Thus, rent associated with employment translates into unemployment.
As being unemployed is the outside option for a worker, rent implies that it
is strictly better (in expected terms) to be employed than to be unemployed.
But this is inconsistent with full employment.
T h et r a n s i t i o nr a t et oe m p l o y m e n ti sd e t e r m i n e ds ot h a tt h er e n t sa r e
dissipated. Inserting U0 = U0∗ into (8) and re-arranging gives
p =
(r + s)U0∗ − z
R
(9)
Let x denote the unemployment rate in the economy. Using the fact that







where Z = z/(r + s) is the asset value of staying unemployed forever. Note
that if we disregard discounting and set the unemployment beneﬁte q u a lt o
zero, the unemployment rate is x = R/U∗. Thus, the expected fraction of the
time the worker is unemployed equals the fraction of rents to total expected
income when unemployed.
3E ﬃciency
L e tu sn o wa n a l y s et h ee ﬃciency of the equilibrium outcome. Obviously, the
equilibrium outcome is not ﬁrst best, as ﬁrst best requires that c0(e)=γ and
no unemployment. One can obtain (almost) full employment by having a ar-
bitrarily high negative unemployment beneﬁt, and the eﬃcient level of eﬀort
can be approximated by a correctly designed negative income tax schedule
on labour income (see below for the eﬀect of taxes on the wage contract).
These policy recommendations will probably not be taken seriously by any
government, for reasons not captured by our model.
14In our view, a more interesting question is as follows: given the behaviour
of the workers and the entry decisions of ﬁrms, are the wage contracts chosen
by ﬁrms socially optimal? Put diﬀerently, if a social planner were able to
overrun the ﬁrms’ design of wage contracts, while all other decisions were left
t ot h ea g e n t si nt h em a r k e t ,w o u l dt h ep l a n n e rl i k et od os o ?
We will say that the equilibrium wage contracts chosen by ﬁrms are con-
strained eﬃcient if they maximise welfare given 1) the workers’ incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraint, and 2) entry of ﬁrms sat-
isfying the incentive compatibility constraint. We want to analyse whether
the equilibrium wage contracts derived above are constrained eﬃcient.
The planner maximises overall production less the costs of creating jobs.
Let Y (Φ) denote the expected discounted production value (net of eﬀort
costs) of a worker-ﬁrm pair as a function of the wage contract Φ,a n dl e tR(Φ)
denote the associated expected rent the contract allocates to the worker. For
each worker-ﬁrm pair that is formed, the search cost K is incurred 1/[1 −
F(²∗(Φ))] times (a full speciﬁcation of the contract includes a speciﬁcation
of the cut-oﬀ level, and we capture this by writing the cut-oﬀ level as a
function of the contract). Finally, assume that also the social value of the
utility ﬂow of an unemployed worker is equal to z. The arrival rate of job
oﬀers to workers is determined by (9), and can thus be written as a function








(Recall that x denotes unemployment). The planner maximises S given the
constraint that ˙ x = s − (p + s)x.
It is shown in several contexts that the eﬃcient solution maximises the
pay-oﬀ to the unemployed workers, see for instance Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999) and Moen and Rosen (2001), and Pissarides (2000). This is also the
case in this context:
Lemma 3 The planner’s problem is equivalent to the problem of maximising
the expected discounted income, U0, for an unemployed worker. Formally,
the planner maximises U0 given by (7), given (9), workers’ I.C. and I.R.
constraints, and the constraint that Π = K.
Proof :S e eA p p e n d i x
15We are now in the position to show that the equilibrium wage contract





0 (and the I.C. and I.R. constraints)
Π(Φ)=K




0(Φ) S.T. Π(Φ) ≥ K (and the I.C. and I.R. constraints)
Proposition 2 Suppose the equilibrium income z reﬂects the social value
of staying unemployed. Then the equilibrium wage contract is constrained
eﬃcient.
Proof: Let Φ0 denote the socially optimal contract and Φe the equilibrium
contract. Suppose the proposition does not hold. Then U0(Φ0) >U 0(Φe).
However, since Π(Φ0)=K when U = U0(Φ0),i tf o l l o w st h a tΠ(Φ0) >K
when U = U0(Φe).B u tt h e nΦe cannot be a proﬁt-maximising contract. We
have thus derived a contradiction. QED.
When the ﬁrms choose wage contracts, they do not give weight to worker
rents, but set the contract so as to balance rent extraction and worker eﬀort.
Increasing the incentive power of the contract b for some types thus gives
rise to a positive externality on the employee, as this will tend to increase
the rent (from equation (5)). At ﬁrst glance one may therefore expect the
incentive contracts to bee too low powered (too low values of b). However,
this is not correct. The point is that higher worker rents feed directly back
to the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is determined so as to
dissipate all rents, and increasing worker rents only leads to a corresponding
increase in the unemployment rate so that the asset value of an unemployed
worker stays constant.
We want to follow this argument a bit further. Suppose ﬁrms are free to
choose which technology, τ, to apply, which may inﬂuence overall production
as well as the amount of rents allocated to the worker. To be more speciﬁc,
s u p p o s ew ec o u l dw r i t eY = Y (τ,Φ) and R = R(τ,Φ).T h eﬁrm chooses the
contract that maximises Π =( 1− F(²c(τ,Φ))[Y (τ,Φ) − R(τ,Φ) − U0].T h e
16ﬁr m sw i l lc h o o s et h ev a l u eo fτ, τ∗,t h a tm a x i m i s e sΠ(τ), and in equilibrium,
Π(τ∗)=K.
It is straight forward to show that the planner’s objective still is to max-
imise the asset value of an unemployed worker. Proposition 1 implies that the
planner, for any give τ, chooses the same contract as the proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrms. Furthermore, since worker rents have no value for the planner (as it is
dissipated away through a higher unemployment rate anyway), the planner
chooses the same technology as the proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms in the market.
Lemma 4 The ﬁrms’ choice of production technology is constrained eﬃ-
cient.
Proof :L e tτ0 denote the constrained eﬃcient value of τ,a n dl e tΦ0 =
Φ(τ0) denote the associated optimal contract (which is equal to the equilib-
rium contract with this technology). Free entry implies that
U






(1 − F(τ0,² ∗
c(Φ0))
It follows that τ∗ is constrained eﬃcient. If not, U00 >U 0∗. But then the
ﬁrm in the market could do better by choosing τ0 and contract Φ0 minus an
arbitrarily small constant. QED
Note, however, that overall production in the economy can be increased
by production subsidies, ﬁnanced for instance by a lump-sum tax. Such
a subsidy leaves the equilibrium incentives (and thus the expected rents)
unaltered, but increases U0∗, and from (10) it follows that unemployment
falls and hence that employment increases.
An underlying assumption behind proposition 1 is that the unemploy-
ment income z reﬂects the social value of being unemployed. Thus, z may
reﬂect the value of leisure, of home production, or alternatively wages in a
secondary labour market (without unemployment). An interesting observa-
tion, following directly from equation (6) and that Π is independent of z is
the following:
Lemma 5 Irrespective of whether z represents the social value of being un-
employed or unemployment beneﬁts, welfare is independent of z
Thus z,e v e ni fi tr e ﬂects wages in a secondary sector, does not inﬂu-
ence welfare. The reason is that a higher z makes it more time-consuming
17to dissipate rents, and thus increases unemployment (or the time spent in
the inferior secondary sector) exactly so much that the unemployed workers
obtain the same utility level.
Suppose then that z (partly) consists of transfers from the government
(unemployment beneﬁt), and hence does not reﬂect the social value of being
unemployed. The ﬁr s tt h i n gt on o t ei st h a tt h el e m m aa b o v ei m p l i e st h a tt h e
unemployment beneﬁts are a total waste of resources, as they do not inﬂuence
the well-being of unemployed workers (from equation 6). It follows that the
u n e m p l o y m e n tr a t ed o e sn o ti n ﬂuence the equilibrium wage contract or the
equilibrium cut-oﬀ rate either. However, the unemployment rate increases
with the unemployment beneﬁt, as it takes more time to dissipate the rents
associated with employment.
The constrained optimal wage contract in the presence of unemployment
beneﬁts is, however, of lower incentive power than the equilibrium wage
contract.
Lemma 6 With strictly positive unemployment beneﬁts, the equilibrium wage
contract is more incentive powered than the constrained eﬃcient wage con-
tract
Proof: With zero unemployment beneﬁt, worker rents have zero social
value. With positive unemployment beneﬁt, worker rents have strictly nega-
tive social value. The planner’s maximisation problem is thus identical with
the maximisation problem (1), but with u(²) replaced with ku(²),w h e r e







As b decreases in k,t h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o f .Q E D .
To gain intuition, note that a positive unemployment beneﬁtm a k e st h e
government bear part of the burden associated with being unemployed. This
is not taken into account when the incentive contracts are determined.
By contrast, taxes on labour income will have a tendency to reduce the
equilibrium incentive power of the contracts below its constrained optimal
l e v e la sl o n ga se ﬀort is not deductible. We return to this point shortly.
4 Determinants of the unemployment rate
18As discussed in the introduction, there exists anecedotal evidence that wage
contracts have tended to be more incentive powered lately, and in any case
it may be interesting to analyse the eﬀect of more incentive-powered wage
contracts on the unemployment rate. As we will see, the eﬀect on the un-
employment rate depends on the reasons why the incentive power of the
contracts has increased. That is, which of the structural parameters in the
model has triggered the increase in b(²).
We are not able to characterise the eﬀects of a change in the cut-oﬀ level
on the total amount of rents allocated to the worker in the general case (see
below for special cases). We therefore make the assumption that the cut-oﬀ
level is equal to zero. Thus, the ﬁrm accepts all matches. As a description of
ﬁrm behaviour, this assumption may actually be a good approximation: given
that a ﬁrm has selected a worker out of many, and possibly spent resources
on training him (depending on the interpretation of K), the likelihood that
he will be dismissed when his worker-ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity component is
revealed may be fairly low.
Let us ﬁrst analyse the eﬀects of changes in b(²) around the optimal sched-
ule b∗(²).A sw eh a v es e e n ,Uo(b) is maximised at b∗(²).F r o mt h ee n v e l o p e
theorem it follows that U0 is approximately constant for wage contracts close
to b∗(²). From equation (5) and (10) it follows that stronger incentives, cet.
par., tend to yield more rents to the workers and thereby higher unemploy-
ment rate.
Note also that it follows directly from (4) that b∗(²) is independent of y.9
Still, an increased y means that rents are less important relative to overall
productivity (and therefore to Uo) and the unemployment rate x falls (from
10). The point is that the cost of being unemployed relative to the expected
rent when becoming employed increases. We refer to this as the productivity
eﬀect.
Eﬀort provision more important (γ increases)
The point here is that the unobservable part of the workers’ eﬀort becomes
m o r ei m p o r t a n t . T h ep a r to ft h ej o bt a s k st h a tc a nb eo b s e r v e db yt h e
ﬁrm can be monitored directly through contracts. Incentive schemes are
9This actually stems from an artefactual assumption in the model, that the disutility of
eﬀort in terms of money is independent of the overall wealth of the agents in the economy.
If the marginal disutility of eﬀort increases with overall wealth, an increase in y will reduce
b.
19important in order to promote unobservable eﬀort.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that jobs have become more autonomous
lately, as more authority is delegated to individual workers. This may indi-
cate that worker eﬀort to is less observable, and therefore that eﬀort provision
through wage contracts is more important.
We analyse the eﬀect of a change in technology which increases the im-
pact of unobservable eﬀort, keeping the relative importance of the worker-
ﬁrm speciﬁc productivity term constant. An increase in γ implies that the
deterministic part of worker productivity becomes more important relative
to the stochastic productivity term. In order to neutralise this eﬀect, we
scale down the constant term y in such a way that u0 is constant.10 We refer
to this as a balanced increase in γ.
An increase in γ implies that eﬀort provision becomes more important.
For a given e,a ni n c r e a s ei nγ tends to increase the right-hand side of equation
(4), and thus b∗(²). On the other hand, for a given b,a ni n c r e a s ei nγ tends
to increase e.G i v e nt h a tc000(e) ≥ 0 this tends to reduce incentives, as rent
extraction becomes more important. The net eﬀect is therefore in principle
undetermined. However, very unrestrictive assumptions on the cost-function
ensure that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominate so that b increases in γ. More speciﬁcally,
it is suﬃcient to assume that c00(e)/c0(e) is nonincreasing.11 This is satisﬁed
for all polynomials on the form xn as well as for the exponential ex,f o rw h i c h
it is constant.
Proposition 3 Suppose c00(e)/c0(e) is strictly decreasing in e.T h e n a b a l -
anced increase in γ increases the incentive power of the wage contract and
increases the unemployment rate
Proof :F o r a n y g i v e n b, c0(e)=γb, hence c00(e)/γ2 = b2c00(e)/c0(e)2.
We can thus write equation (4) as b(²)=h(²,γ,b) where h(²,γ,b)=1−
α
1−F(²)
f(²) b2c00(e)/c0(e)2.S i n c e c00(e)/c0(e)2 decreases in e
∂h(²,γ,b)
∂γ < 0.S i n c e
also
∂h(²,γ,b)
∂γ < 0 it follows directly that b increases in γ. From (5) it follows
10Exactly the same results can be obtained if we assume that expected worker produc-
tivity stays constant. In this case, we will actually obtain a reinforcement through the
eﬀects of the change in γ on u0. If expected worker productivity stays constant, increased
worker rents imply a fall in u0, which again will increase unemployment even further.
11As will be clear from the proof, it is actually suﬃcient to assume that c00(e)/c0(e)2 is
decreasing.
20that E [ρ], and thereby also R, increases in γ, but then it follows from (10)
that x increases in γ as well. QED.
The intuition is straight-forward. If unobserved eﬀort becomes more im-
portant, ﬁrms will provide their workers with stronger incentives, as incentive
provision becomes more important relative to rent extraction. As a result,
the expected rent associated with employment increases, and thus also un-
employment.
Reduced importance of unobserved productivity term (reduced α)
Ar e d u c t i o ni nα may have diﬀerent causes. Firstly, it may follow from better
selection procedures and screening tests available for employers, for instance
due to new batteries of personal and aptitude tests and the emergence of
professional hiring agencies. In some countries, improved quality of schooling
as well as more specialised education may lead to similar eﬀects. Secondly, a
reduction in ² may also follow from a greater segregation in the labour market.
This may tend to reduce job heterogeneity within each segment, implying
that the set of jobs a given worker applies for becomes more homogeneous.
Acemoglu (1999) gives some evidence that the degree of heterogeneity among
workers has indeed declined over the past decades.
From (4) it follows that an increase in α will lead to a reduction in b for all
types ². Thus, as workers’ ex post heterogeneity increases, the optimal wage
contract becomes less incentive powered, as rent extraction becomes more
important. A reduction in α thus leads to more incentive-powered wage
contracts. A reduction in α will reduce overall worker productivity, and this
will tend to increase the unemployment rate. However, as for changes in
γ, we adjust y correspondingly so that the equilibrium value of u0 remains
constant, and refer to this as a balanced reduction in α.
A reduction in α has two opposing eﬀects on worker rents. For a given
wage contract, less ex post worker heterogeneities lead to lower expected
rents. On the other hand, a more incentive-powered contract tends to in-









In order to get clear-cut results, we assume that c000(e)=0(i.e., that c(e) is



















We deﬁne the average value of b as b =
R ²max
²min b(²)/(²max −²min). It follows
that if b ≤ 1/2, then a reduction in α increases worker rents. We have thus
shown the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Consider a balanced reduction in α (the importance of ex
post heterogeneities). This will lead to an increase in the unemployment rate
if b<1/2 and a decrease in the unemployment rate if b>1/2,w h e r eb is
the average incentive power of the contract as deﬁned above.
One should note that the average value b,a sw eh a v ed e ﬁned it, only
corresponds to the expected value of b(²) in the special case when ² is uni-
formly distributed. Since b0(²) > 0, it follows that b may be less than 1/2
even if E [b(²)] is greater than 1/2 if most of the probability mass is located
at high values of ² while the opposite is true if most of the probability mass is
located at the lower part of the distribution. Finally, if c00(e) is strictly posi-
tive, this will reduce the responsiveness of the optimal contract to changes
in α, and will therefore make it more likely that reduced α leads to reduced
unemployment than what the proposition indicates.
The eﬀect of taxes
The wage contracts may also be inﬂuenced by the marginal tax rate. As will
be clear shortly, a reduction in the marginal tax rate will (under reasonable
assumptions) tend to increase the incentive power of the wage contract. This
is particularly interesting because marginal tax rates have fallen in most
western countries the last decade.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a proportional tax on the ﬁrms’ net proﬁts
when all costs (including K) are deductible. In this case, ﬁrms choose b to
maximise (1 − t)π instead of just π. It follows that the equilibrium remains
unchanged. A tax on ﬁrm proﬁts is thus neutral.
22Consider next a linear tax on wages. The income tax T is given by
T = tw + A
where A is a constant. We refer to t as the marginal tax rate. Below we
analyse the eﬀects of reductions in the marginal tax rate. In order to avoid
the productivity eﬀect, we simultaneously increase the ﬁxed term A so as to
keep u0 constant, and refer to this as a balanced reduction in the marginal
tax rate.
The optimal contract can be derived in exactly the same manner as before.
Worker utility is given by u(²)=w(1 − t) − c(e).F i r m p r o ﬁtc a nt h u sb e
written as
π(²)=y + α² + γe −
u(²)+c(e)
1 − t
The truth-telling condition is given by u0(²)=c0(e)α/γ,a sb e f o r e .T h eﬁrst












Integrating up λ, inserting and re-arranging thus gives
c





In a menu of linear contracts, the corresponding incentive parameter b is such









It follows that for a given e, a reduced marginal tax rate t shifts the right-
hand side of this equation up, thus tending to increase b. On the other hand,
reduced marginal taxes tend to increase the eﬀort level (for a given b), which
will increase c00(e), and this pushes in the opposite direction. However, we can
show that the latter eﬀect dominates provided that c00(e)/c0(e) is decreasing
in e
23Proposition 5 Suppose c00(e)/c0(e) is decreasing in e.T h e nar e d u c t i o no f
the marginal tax rate t increases the incentive power of the wage contract,
and a balanced decrease reduces unemployment.
Proof: For any given b, c0(e)=γb(1 − t), and hence c00(e)/[(1 − t)γ2]=
bc00(e)/c0(e)γ. W ec a nt h u sw r i t ee q u a t i o n( 1 1 )a sb(²)=h(²,γ,b),w h e r e
h(²,γ,b)=1 −α
1−F(²)
f(²) bc00(e)/c0(e)γ.S i n c ee decreases in t and since c00(e)/c0(e)
falls in e, it follows that
∂h(γ,b)
∂t < 0. Since also
∂h(γ,b)
∂b < 0 it follows
that b decreases in t.T h e ﬁrst part of the proposition thus follows. Since
ρ(²)=
R ²0
²c u0(²)d² and u0(²)=c0(e)α/γ = α(1−t)b it follows that a reduction
in t increases ρ(²) for all ² , and thereby also R. But then it follows from
(10) that a balanced decrease in t increases the unemployment rate x.Q E D .
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the impact of performance pay contracts on the overall
performance of the economy. We analyse whether the incentive power of the
equilibrium wage contract is socially eﬃcient. In the absence of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts the incentive power is constrained eﬃcient, while with positive
unemployment beneﬁts the incentive power is too high.
The model provides three possible explanations for the documented in-
crease in the use of performance pay over the last decade: First, an increased
importance of non-observable eﬀort. Second, a fall in the marginal tax rate.
Third, a reduction in the heterogeneity of workers performing the same task.
All three changes are likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Unique cut-oﬀ
Deﬁne
Ψ(²)=y + α² + γe − u





24Equation (3) deﬁnes ² uniquely iﬀ Ψ(²)=0is uniquely deﬁned.
dΨ(²)
d²























d² =( c0(e) − γ)de
d² (from equation (2)) yields
dΨ(²)
d²







Hence Ψ(²)=0is uniquely deﬁned.















α u0(x)v(x)dx.L e t v =1− e F, v0 = −de F, u =
R ²0
²c αb(²)d²,
u0 = αb(²).T h i sg i v e s
E [ρ]=−|
²max










αb(²)(1 − e F)d²
Appendix 3: Proof of Lemma 3
The current-value Hamiltonian associated with the planner’s maximisation
problem can be written as
H









c = z + p(Φ)[Y (Φ) −
K
1 − F(²∗(Φ))
] − λ(p + s)










The ﬁrst of these conditions implies that




In the maximisation problem in the second equation, the state variable x
and the adjungated variable are regarded as constant, and the maximisation







which is equivalent with maximising λ deﬁned by equation (12).
We want to show that this is equivalent with maximising U0 deﬁned by
(7), given (9) and the constraint that Π = K. The free entry assumption
implies that the expected proﬁto faﬁrm that hires a worker is equal to
K/(1 − F(²∗)). The rest of the surplus is allocated to the worker. Thus,
W(Φ)=Y (Φ) − K/(1 − F).I n s e r t e di n t o( 7 ) ,w eﬁnd that
(r + s)U





The expression for U0 in (13) is formally identical to the expression for
λ in equation (12). Maximising λ given that Y = Y (Φ) and p = p(Φ) must
then be equivalent with maximising U0 given the same two constraints. QED
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